Schurz promptly wrote an energetic letter of protest to Garfield, lamenting the latter's defection from the cause of reform. Garfield's only reply was a denial of defection, and an explicit disapproval of what Hayes had done—thus illustrating the difference between logic and politics.

Neither party was entirely in line with Mr. Schurz's ideas on the questions he considered vital and urgent—the tariff, the currency, and civil-service reform. But the Republicans, led by an experienced civilian, seemed likely to be less unfavorable to those ideas, especially in regard to currency and the civil service, than the Democrats led by a soldier. Had the Democrats nominated a seasoned reformer on a reform platform, one could easily imagine Mr. Schurz resigning his Secretaryship and leading the Independents[1] to the support of the Democratic candidate. In the existing dilemma it was, for non-partisans, a choice of evils. And Schurz's position in Hayes' Cabinet was expected to help him exert a good influence over the Republicans.

Unfortunately, Garfield's attitude allowed partisanship unrestrained control. The campaign managers resorted, with slight attempts at concealment, to the assessment of office-holders and to other old-time methods, and sought as usual, to distract attention from them by "viewing with alarm" the wicked Democrats. The hideousness of secession, the impenitence and malignity of the "rebel brigadiers," and their fell

purpose to subject the North to the domination of the "solid South"—furnished a theme for even the more sane and reputable orators. The time, they declared, was hardly less critical than in 1860, and the duty of patriots no less clear and peremptory than then.

Mr. Schurz spoke for the Republicans in the doubtful States of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey and Con-